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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
CLAY Y. STARK, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 20010536-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Mr. Stark raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first 
time while on appeal. Jorge H. Galvez, former counsel, rendered a deficient 
performance which fell well below the standards of reasonable professional judgment 
causing substantial prejudice to Mr. Stark. He failed as effective legal counsel for the 
following reasons, which arguments are contained later in this brief, to wit: (1) failed to 
pursue a pretrial motion to suppress or weigh the strength of the State's case through a 
preliminary hearing, and (2) Mr. Galvez's strategy at trial consisted of presenting a 
question of law to the jury rather than defending questions of fact-Mr. Stark only trial 
strategy was to seek jury nullification for the arresting officer's lapse in certificate to 
operate the intoxilyzer (meaning the jury should find Mr. Stark not guilty just because 
the arresting officer did not have a valid certificate to administer the breath test). (See 
the opening statement and closing arguments of the trial transcript) (T. at 17-20, 106-
107).l 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). Mr. Stark appeals the 
final order and judgment of the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second Judicial 
District Court, in and for Weber County involving a conviction of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Whether Mr. Stark received ineffective assistance of counsel by Mr. 
Jorge H. Galvez, Attorney at Law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ineffective Assistance. This Court should review Mr. Stark's claim of 
1
 For the purpose of this brief, references to the record will be "(R. at nn.)" and 
references to the trial transcript will be "(T. at nn.)" 
2 
ineffective assistance of counsel even though raised first time on appeal by his new 
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. 
The Because new counsel represents Maestas in this appeal and because we 
believe the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on direct appeal, we will review those claims as a matter of law. See 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
STATEMENTS OF FACT ON THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case; 
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment of Judge Taylor, of 
the Second District Court. On June 4, 2001, the trial court sentenced Mr. Stark for 
Driving Under the Influence, a Third Degree Felony in violation of 41-6-44, imposing 
a maximum prison term of five years. (R. at 100). This conviction resulted from a 
"guilty" jury verdict of a trial which took place on April 18, 2001. (T. at 114). 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
This matter commenced on April 18, 2000 by Information. The 
Information claimed that on or about April 14, 2000, Mr. Stark "did drive or was in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a blood or breath alcohol concentration 
of .08 grams . . . ." (R. at 1). On April 24, 2000, Mr. Stark appeared before the 
3 
Honorable Stanton Taylor and was arraigned. (R. at 10). On April 28, 2000, Mr. 
Galvez appeared as counsel for Mr. Stark. (R. at 12). On June 5, 2000, the parties 
participated in a disposition hearing with no resolution, so a Preliminary Hearing was 
requested. (R. at 21). On July 3, 2000, the court convened for the preliminary hearing; 
thereafter Mr. Stark was arraigned. (R. at 23-26). The minutes of the preliminary 
hearing show that no prelim was held-counsel had Mr. Stark waive the taking of 
preliminary evidence. (R. at 27). Thereafter, another disposition hearing was 
conducted on August 7, 2000-still the matter was not negotiated. (R. at 29). 
Based upon the parties' failure to resolve the matter-Mr. Galvez 
"indicated to the court that he will be filing a motion to suppress." (R. at 29). The 
court instructed that the defense was to file a motion by August 28, 2000, the State 
would respond by September 8, 2000, and Mr. Galvez was to reply by September 15, 
2000. In addition, the court set a suppression hearing to convene on September 18, 
2000. (R. at 29). 
On the date of the hearing, all of the parties attended to find out that the 
defense failed to file any motion. From the minutes of the hearing, the court noted: 
Suppression Hearing not held. Mr. Galvez indicates to the Court that a 
Suppression Hearing would not be needed. The defendant enters a not guilty 
plea to the charges. The sets a trial date of 11/30/00 with a final pre-trial on 
11/13/00. 
(R. at 31). On the date of November 13, 2000, Mr. Galvez moved for a continuance 
of the trial due to a calendar conflict-the State concurred, (r. at 35), and trial was 
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rescheduled for February 6, 2001. Id. However, on February 2, 2001, the trial court 
rescheduled the trial to April 18, 2001 due a conflict of its own calendar. (R. at 40). 
The April 18, 2001 jury trial was conduct wherein the jury found Mr. Stark guilty. (T. 
at 114). But for Mr. Galvez's trial error and mishandling of the case, Mr. Stark would 
not have been convicted. 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
At trial, Mr. Galvez makes his case well understood for the jury in his 
opening statements. (T. at 17-20). [Attached as Addendum B]. During his statements, 
Mr. Galvez explained that he attended law school in India as part of his education. (T. 
at 18). Mr. Galvez explained that in India they don't have juries, just judges. (T. at 
18). He explained that the jury would be decided the facts of this case, and that of 
"jury nullification." He stated, "The whole concept, they teach it to you in law school 
is jury nullification, okay. It's one plus two plus three doesn't necessarily mean the 
same to you as yo me. The jury gets to decide." (T. at 18). 
Mr. Galvez, then went on to describe what the jury would have to decide 
in the case at hand. He explained that the "State can't have it's cake and eat it." He 
claimed that the State cannot pursue Mr. Stark's violation of the law while excusing the 
arresting officer's lapse in certification to administer a breathalyzer. (T. at 20). More 
particularly, Mr. Galvez puts it: (T. at 20). 
The State can't have it's cake and eat it. They can't say> Of, Mr. Stark, on the 
law, because you know, he didn't comply with the specific rule and then say but, 
5 
my officer wasn't certified but that's okay because it he became certified later 
on. 
He then compared the lapsed certification to a suspension of an attorney's 
license to practice law. (T. at 20). Interestingly, he pointed out, that he don't think the 
Judge would allow him to practice if he wasn't a lawyer-obviously sensing the question 
to be one for the judge and not appropriate for a jury. 
Later on, after the hearing of testimony from the witnesses, which 
consisted on the arresting officer, Jason Talbot, Scott Hathcock, the State's expert, and 
the Mr. and Mrs. Stark, the parties offered their closing arguments.2 (T. at 98, 102, 
106-112). [Galvez's closing arguments are included in Addendum C]. Mr. Galvez 
reiterated his earlier opening statements, pleading with the jury to acquit Mr. Stark 
based upon the officer's lack of certification. Particularly, he claimed, "I'm asking you 
is the whole testimony by the deputy truthful, consistent, necessarily so? Obviously he 
wasn't certified. You get to decide what that means, what it may or may not mean." 
(T. at 110). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Mr. Stark has met the Maestas, requirement to prevail on 
appeal with the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-in this case, Jorge H. Galvez. 
2
 Note: Mr. Galvez had the defendant testify concerning his driving and his refusal 
to submit to sobriety tests. It is uncertain what the point of this was. The State didn't even 
both with cross-examining. 
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Mr. Galvez failure to put on a defense before the judge of clearly suppressionable 
issues and then present as trial strategy questions of law by jury nullification fell well 
below the standard of competent legal counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
MR. STARK IS ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL AND A NEW TRIAL DUE TO 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF FORMER TRIAL COUNSEL. 
This matter is on appeal from the Sentence and conviction by a jury trial. 
Mr. Stark was sentenced on June 4, 2001. He was convicted by jury verdict on April 
18, 2001 at the hand of counsel, Jorge H. Galvez, whose only trial strategy was jury 
nullification erroneously arguing questions of law, rather than only questions of fact. 
During this appeal, Mr. Stark raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
pertaining to his prior counsel, Mr. Galvez-this claim is raised first time while on 
appeal. To be successful of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Mr. 
Stark must show 
that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists 
a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would 
likely have been more favorable to [that party]. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066-67, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "Because a 
defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of the Strickland test, it is 
unnecessary for this court to apply both parts where our inquiry reveals that one 
of its parts is not satisfied." State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1998). 
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State v. Mecham, 2000 Utah App. 247 (August 17, 2000). In this matter the record 
shows clearly that Mr. Galvez's trial strategy was jury nullification asking the jury to 
disregard the breath test results merely because the officer's certification was lapsed at 
the time he operated the Intoxilyzer. (T. at 17-20, 110). Counsel attempted to compare 
the lapsed certification to practicing law without a license. (T. at 17-20, 106-113). 
Deputy Talbot admitted not having a valid certificate during trial, (T. at 48-49), and 
then the State defended the lapsed certification by having an Intoxilyzer technician, 
Scott Hathcock, inappropriately testify at trial about an operator's certification. (T. at 
72). 
Meanwhile, this case not only involves what the trial record contains, but 
what the trial record fails to contain due to other failures by counsel. Mr. Galvez had 
the opportunity to file a Suppression Motion, but failed to take advantage of that. (R. at 
31). The record shows that after waiving a preliminary hearing, (r. at 27), Mr. Galvez 
requested a suppression hearing, (r. at 29), but then failed to meet any of the motion 
deadlines before the September 18, 2000 hearing. Id. Instead of informing the court of 
his error, he simply claimed "a Suppression Hearing would not be needed." (R. at 31). 
Counsel should have apologized for not filing the motion and requested an extension of 
time. Clearly in reviewing the facts of this case from the police reports in this 
counsel's possession, the defense should have filed a motion to suppress relying on 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct. App 1992). Warden is on point with 
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this matter where an officer approached the defendant under the guise of a community 
caretaker, and not for suspicion of any criminal wrongdoing. In this matter, by time of 
the officer approached Mr. Stark, Mr. Stark was already stopped to fix his flat tire. (T. 
at 24). Deputy Talbot claimed he "wasn't sure if [Mr. Stark] knew the was flat or not" 
as he passed Mr. Stark traveling the opposite direction. By the time Talbot had turned 
around though, Mr. Stark was stopping in a parking lot in order to repair the tire. (T. 
at 24). The officer did not catch up with Mr. Stark until the casted Mr. Stark was 
already out of his vehicle. (T. at 24-25). Because of these facts, there was no longer a 
reason for the officer to approach Mr. Stark "out of concern." Only after the contact 
was made did a detection of an odor of alcohol arise. (T. at 25). 
Clearly, Mr. Galvez should have filed a motion to suppress evidence 
-claiming a lack of reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer relying on Warden. 
Because he failed to file the motion, counsel rendered himself ineffective before the 
jury on April 18, 2001. Mr. Galvez didn't even raise an oral motion, whether to 
suppress evidence or for directed verdict, at the time of trial once these facts were 
made known to the court. Clearly this manner of representation is defective far below 
the standard. 
Other issues counsel should have presented in defending a felony DUI 
were that (1) the State provided defective notice of it's expert witness, Scott Hathcock 
testimony. The notice, (r. at 44), first claimed there to be "[attached copies of the 
9 
affidavits for before and after the date of the test and a copy of Trooper Hathcock's 
Curriculum Vitae. There wasn't. Secondly, during trial the expert inappropriately 
exceeded the scope of the suggested testimony. (T.at 72). During trial, the prosecution 
had the Hathcock testify about the arresting officer's lapsed certification. The 
certification requirement is a question of law, not a question of fact. See Rules R714-
500-5 and R714-500-6 of the Utah Administrative Code. [A copy is attached herewith 
Addendum A]. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10 (1953, as amended) particularly requires a 
jury to determine questions of fact, and that questions of law are to be determined by 
the court. Id. What was counsel thinking when he handled this case? He certainly 
wasn't thinking consistent with Section 77-17-10. Jury nullification for the officer's 
lapsed certification was not the approach on a third degree felony. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Stark has been unjustly dealt with at the 
hand of his own counsel. This Court should either vacate the sentence or reverse the 
conviction, and remand this case for further proceeding with instructions by the Court. 
Particularly, the defendant requests for a new trial in this matter-Mr. Oliver is willing to 
conduct a new trial on Mr. Stark's behalf. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of 
January, 2002. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this day of April, 2002,1 
served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF, postage prepaid, to: 
Brett J. DelPorto 
Office of Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. BBBox 140854 
Salt La City, Utah 84114-0854 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Addendum A 
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
1 
R714-500-5. Program Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, methods, and programs, hereinafter "program", 
must be certified by the department. 
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or laboratory shall submit an application to the 
department for certification. The application shall show the brand and/or model of the 
instrument to be used and contain a resume of the program to be followed. An on-site inspection 
shall be made by the department to determine compliance with all applicable provisions in this 
rule. 
C. Certification of a program may be denied, suspended, or revoked by the department if, 
based on information obtained by the department, program supervisor, or technician, the agency 
or laboratory fails to meet the criteria as outlined by the department. 
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall meet the following criteria: 
(1) The results of tests to determine the concentration of alcohol on a person's breath shall be 
expressed as equivalent grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. The results of such tests shall 
be entered in a permanent record book for department use. 
(2) Printed checklists, outlining the method of properly performing breath tests shall be 
available at each location where tests are given. Test record cards used in conjunction with breath 
testing shall be available at each location where tests are given. Both the checklist and test 
record card, after completion of a test should be retained by the operator. 
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a routine basis, not to exceed 40 days between 
calibration tests, by a technician, depending on location of instruments and area of responsibility. 
(4) Certification procedures to certify the breath testing instrument shall be performed by a 
technician as required in this rule, or by using such procedures as recommended by the 
manufacturer of the instrument to meet its performance specifications, as derived from: 
(a) electrical power tests, 
(b) operating temperature tests, 
(c) internal purge tests, 
(d) internal calibration tests, 
(e) diagnostic tests, 
(f) invalid function tests, 
(g) known reference samples testing, and 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
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(h) measurements displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(5) Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book retained by the 
technician. A report of the certification procedure shall be recorded on the approved form 
(affidavit) and sent to the program supervisor. 
(6) All analytical results on a subject test shall be recorded, using terminology established by 
state statute and reported to three decimal places. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L shall be 
reported as 0.237. 
(7) The instrument must be operated by either a certified operator or technician. 
R714-500-6. Operator Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators", must be certified by the 
department. 
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a program supervisor 
and/or technician. 
C. Initial Certification 
(1) In order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing instrument, an 
applicant must successfully complete a course of instruction approved by the department, which 
must include as a minimum the following: 
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. Report Form. 
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing, driving 
under the influence, case law and other alcohol related laws. 
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated tests on the 
instruments, including demonstrations under the supervision of a class instructor. 
f. One hour for examination and critique of course. 
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a certificate will be issued 
that will be valid for two years. 
D. Renewal Certification 
(1) The operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration date. The minimum 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
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requirement for renewal of operator certification will be: 
a. Two hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. Report Form and 
testimony of arresting officer. 
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and detecting the 
drinking driver. 
e. One hour for examination and critique of course. 
f. Or the operator must successfully complete the Compact Disc Computer program 
including successful completion of exam. Results of exams must be forwarded to program 
supervisor and a certification certificate will be issued. 
(2) Any operator who allows his/her certification to expire one year or longer must retake 
and successfully complete the initial certification course as outlined in paragraph C of this 
section. 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
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77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact by the 
jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as well as fact but 
they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
History: C. 1953,77-17-10, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2. 
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions 
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
Addendum B 
Galvez's Opening Statements 
And Deputy Talbot asked him,, specifically, are \ou 
under the influence of alcohol right now. Werp you ni i» - t.he 
in: ...uence when you operated your vehicle and Mr. Stark said, 
yes. So he admitted that he was driving while under the 
i i i t I n e i i •. 
The o:ner w:tn^s that *^ il r1 esent :r" tn« witness, 
o jnarae of trit .niv,XaT/zer machines 
throng:.: :*: the Slate and what he i %^ ' ° "i^4"!' 1 y he' 50 
a: .' • • . : , . - ju.irrat:.:; ;)i: that 
macnin^ . n«-v o tnrough certain steps * ; ma'^ - ci:re one 
ms " * • - . . navp people 
that are getting wrongly convicted or arrested for D'.'l and they 
have a certain procedure f hoy f In in. 11 » .lie 
machine is acting, is operating appropriately ana they do that 
monthly and by doing one test this nii'iifli rinc • ' is next 
month, they can assure that between those tw tests, a_l of the 
tests that were given were done appropriate,,] y and proper] y and 
'i will testily that he checked the certification of thi s 
machine oefore this test was givpn ana again after and that is 
. : : ie result was accurate and 
that would be the evidence that the State will present today. 
Thank yoi ,1 „ 
MR. GALVEZ: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm 
sure the Judge will express t-u yMii ,mJ hi 1 I 1 <• id' express* -d to 
you how important it is to have you here today. I went, to law 
17 
1 ! school in India as part of my education. And there they don't 
t 
2 | have juries, just the judge decides the facts and it's a 
3 different system. It's very old. In America we're a 
4 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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democratic society. We have juries and I remember when I came 
back and I worked for a law firm in California I had been used, 
you know, I was used to going into court up there and helped 
the lawyers I worked for. And when we came in to Court, we 
were waiting for the judge and everybody and the whole audience 
was waiting for the case to start and as soon as the jury was 
called to come in, the judge instructed us all to stand up and 
what was that? Because that day, just like today, you are the 
judges of what happens. You get to decide, otherwise we would 
have a computer that would just come in and we would put input 
into the computer, .093 kilometers, whatever, you know, 56 
miles per hour. 
But the law is a little more complex than that, it's 
an art. It's not necessarily black and white. If it were we 
probably wouldn't have disputes in court. The whole concept, 
they teach it to you in law school is jury nullification, okay. 
It's one plus two plus three doesn't necessarily mean the same 
to you as to me. The jury gets to decide. 
I suppose the most famous case, although it may bring 
good feelings or bad feelings to some of us, is the 0. J. 
Simpson case. The evidence may have pointed one way and the 
jury decided the other. It doesn't mean that that illegal. It 
18 
1 j doesi 1' 1: rneai i tl lat :i t s rigi it: or i%: ;:..,, c iust meant that 
2 | the jury decided i t that way. 
3 
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Mr Stark i s charged here with DUI. He's not charged 
wi th having bad credit", r ^  havina a ;irpnse when he was 
dri v ii ig, \/ • :: i I I - - ) c — -J -ne worst i.c^ .> :. :n 
the State of Utah. He is charged with DUI - and DUI i n I Jtah, 
i ; :i ] 1 e g a 1 f c r " > d i I i I 1 :  a i i :i 1: : • :I r :i / e i 1 1 e gal 
to drink enough to the point that you cannot drive safely , If 
I hai;; re a :::i lp • of \ r:i i l e , i way If iiiy br :)ther 
has a beer, it may affect him the same way or different because 
w e kave diff e rent metabo] i sms I I: ic i i 1 :i be easy i f my 
brother is a doctor, in Idaho :i 1: won Id be easy ir wr.-_- ' feel 
sick he would hook me up to a machine and immeriia^R: • *~ 
wuu-t. . have a particular disease. He gets to make 
judgments. Yea:", machines are he; of; inaudible) chose 
iQa-jrunes are he_p:^_ aru i::ey rea; zY m^^d gases, they read 
whatever r.ney have * -•- : - ""he^ p are neople there out: 
u * . .v-'. . . ..*• c .-. ; -j.Tment-- gets to make a 
guess. :therw.."^ we wo ., :n' *" ask fcr a second opinion and 
d- • i t i ic t , tl i. :! j udge 
i.r rijL -i::d neiLne: ~ r * • •,*. u ana neitner is v: . Stark. Neither 
is Office Talbot. 
In thi s case there was no true sobriety test 
performed. My client did have a broken 1 eg. Not the one he 
was drivi ng with and (Inaudible) a broken leg on the other leg 
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1 ' that he used. I have some questions and we'll explain those to 
2 | you as to whether the tests were in fact offered, some 
3 
4 
5 
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questions as to whether, you know, the breathalyser information | 
will be presented to you, should be considered by you or should , 
be given weight by you because, you know, we can't just have 
our cake and eat it. The State can't have it's cake and eat 
it. They can't say, Oh, Mr. Stark, on the law, because you 
know, he didn't comply with the specific rule and then say but, 
my officer wasn't certified but that's okay because it he 
became certified later on. 
I don't know how you feel, but if I got a letter from 
the Utah State Bar telling me that my license had been 
suspended and that I couldn't practice law for a month or three 
months of something, I don't think the Judge, in the fact will 
not allow me to stand in front of you and try a case because at 
that point, I am not a lawyer. I'm not certified. I have a 
legal education. I'm smart. I'm whatever, I mean educated, 
whatever, but it doesn't mean that I have that right to make 
that judgment or to make that presentation to you. I will 
submit to you and the evidence will show that similar 
circumstances is what we have here. That's why we're here, to 
ask that you keep an open mind, to ask you to grant (inaudible) 
considered to (inaudible) of the circumstances and then we will 
entrust that judgment to you as you decide. Thank you very 
much. 
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Addendum C 
Galvez's Closing Arguments 
•\~~** :T abov^ , n8. We have shown that in this case. 
• A\I. c.oarqeu with haT*.ng an T-?~ ' • . _ /•suic.e. 
\: / ja^f ci'/.; . ask. you to return a 
~;ui::\ verdict ; r ' -ur.ts. ThdiiK 
.aivez? 
MP. JALVET - adies and Gentlemen ->! I I if- q- vj 
aft-r" ' • , :.i . + _ _* .caVt- ;.een patient, listening 
tc the wr;:.- 3' . ;nere are Lhmqs .1 tne ' - -
\inauair' , . - - -%° us question a^ . wnat 
really happened, as to what: ' ne deputy remembers, • - vy 
ciienT rememb ^ : / .u. There's n.; cispute, I 
wr»u, .1 -'ubir.i4" .- . u, t; v tiv- *-;as -v. ; OPH container * *~e 
vehicle We admit . ' ±\ . Wp'rp . ' nere 
1 • ,;.:"use w^11 about Lnat. We oc r.' " .-..-rrv t^ r.cr aoout tnat. 
Kc ate concernec •.: tite 
c ,"--r:":r:.<-:it is allowed to qo ana prove that re's nui.^v 01 a 
DUI. You can't n a ^
 v —:- ^t: _ _ r+- «y, 
C . _ ^ i^ ,\e ;M- ,,:* *. • technical rn.an.ioca, 
or tnis amount, - : tt . - inaudible) 01 .1 1 'jn Hit other 
hand s-v Wt:* i I, « u 1 I , we weren't kind of playing by the 
rules completely, but don't pay attention to that, yen hmw, 
you can't say that. 
Tf you'd please refer to instruction #28 aqain. The 
lack of certificati~^ . - * 1 J . . ' . airect ~r lack 
. .:::•
 4t upon the test results is an is^e decided by you, 
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1 ! okay? You're the judges. You are the people who will have to 
i 
2 i determine, you know, will have to determine do we let, you 
3 know, do we bend a little bit and let the rules to convict this 
4 man. He was not certified, you know, and that may be simple to 
5 you. It may seem simple to Mr. Saunders or to me. Frankly, 
6 it's not simple enough to the government that they have passed 
7 I an administrative rule that says that you must be certified and 
8 we cannot go backwards and say after the fact, Well, had he 
9 been certified, the same result happened because then I suppose 
10 we're taking advantage of that. 
11 I want to take you, ask your attention again, to 
12 Section 11. Today I said at the beginning, you folks are the 
13 J important parties here. You're the deciders. You decide the 
14 facts. You decide who. You decide why. And I just want to 
15 I read to you because it is your exclusive duty to determine the 
16 facts in this case. You may not believe me. You may not 
17 J believe the deputy. You may not believe my client. You may 
18 J not believe Mr. Saunders, that doesn't matter. It matters as to 
19 J how you go about believing what you believe and why and that 
20 brings me to the next point. 
21 I only put, very briefly, two witnesses on the stand, 
22 okay? That's not because I'm tired or we're lazy and we don't 
23 I have any more things to say, but it has to do mainly with the 
24 point that Judge Taylor lectured us about at the beginning of 
25 J selecting the jury and he explained to us, that this is America 
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1 I and in Anierio.i i :ie detendant doesn't even have to take the 
2 stand, let along prove his innocent to" i i i nave to It's 
3 ! *~t because we ;,oi '* * r fane/ case 
4 ' does: . * . ^ f *& ain:^:4 ' > • ... ,r^" 
5 i i^iow, i Lanc^ Ccise. 
6 ' A i-V M- , :'t<.: A .n — - ^ mere 
7 to asK - . , c r * w - - * * n;> final question 
8 and thai *db, \. .. refuse,: : / i th.s? Yes I 
9 ^^ns: y^ , • * ~. „:.J: .e limittea r , /on -:r :o's 
10 I . u.tm_. r-vtii. incriminatory t tiros He a on ' • - . tn 
11 can ^ admit4-m m-.-.. m e fwc lests wii.cn is 
12 ri'il. a crime but still it's consistent with what the neni'y 
13 said. He admit tod to d I i ' h^ r iti""iqc and the only thin-; he 
14 c. -u - . * :en rie gets t: rue police station. 
15 the deputy an 1 ' said, n -*•-• mr « .-.-now, telling Mr. 
16 S" :- . J.. *,w, something to the effect that it would be 
17 beneficial for you to take the test IV lie in fact, 
18 very emjrhaf i/..-a 1 ! ~>ay:; ' ha*" he never asreed any other questions 
JM I except what's in there in the form. ± "'vink. • J n.-iv« i copy of 
i 
20 ! it to take. That seem -t little stranae to me, you know I 
! ' think tuat we/re nnt robots. You'rp - * iot 
i 
22 computers. We' m hum,in b^iru., WIH-II we talk about the Jazz, 
23 when we Laik about this and that, so whose telling th^ truth 
24 | here/ I'm n *-! " " y - . -t saving their 
25 J recol lect ±or._
 c:o aiiterei.t. nere. Remember, our job is iu; ""0 
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1 I prove that the deputy is lying. Our job is to ask you, is 
2 there a reasonable doubt here as to the whole totality of the 
3 circumstances. Who is telling us the truth? 
4 Mr. Stark says that the deputy asked him at the jail, 
5 you know, do you want to take the intoxilyzer test? His answer, 
6 no. Then I asked him, why did you take it then if the answer 
7 was no? And he says, because the deputy had told me I was a 
8 good guy, I was not, you know, I was not difficult - and I 
9 asked him, was he difficult with you? No, he wasn't. 
10 Consistent. Consistency all along and then he says and he told 
11 me that it might help me. He didn't think I was under the 
12 influence and it might help me. All right. That may not be in 
13 the instruction of the elements. That may not be, you know, 
14 something that is, you know, written in stone or whatever, but 
15 it bothers me. I hope it bothers you that, you know, we 
16 shouldn't let those kinds of things happen and today you are 
17 the law. You're suppose to obey. You're suppose to acquit my 
18 client or convict him because a Martian told you yesterday that 
19 I was (inaudible). That's not the law, within reason. I am 
20 not asking you to pay attention to the circumstances. It would 
21 be easy if it was just a matter of adding two plus two equals 
22 four and we get out of here in minutes, but we have a greater 
23 picture to deal with. 
24 In that regard, instruction #31, the Judge read to 
25 J you, it says the presumption of innocence goes with Mr. Stark 
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and it.':; hi „ daunders burden >c rr:ve tha~ 
2 
3 
4 
5 
must not prove it like * ^ - n v c : e • ,*.- >. In 
d •• ...use W P call thai a oreocnderance r:" the evidence " d 
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if you imagine there is an : t- • 
. * - eviaence an: w-
enouon t*. :.iit the scales, m d 
icA' -•-• . •-•: , you Know, " 
olamtir: t-_ w.i th<- ,awsuit. 
auess you know, 
the evidence, shouiu 
uvorce, a 
's eunuch : - the 
he 
pres'ump1 " :.e scales Lin^ way, okay, favor 
and the government has to put on enough w^iqht 'i"ii tiidt 
imaginary son l. i . • i i II M , 'mat's what; it means, presumption 
beyond a reasonable dour 'V * ask:n-. 
evidence or to ,c mu^*. nor ne :ju:ity 
.-<iuse of seme- convoluted tnink^n ; process. ± m a--: to 
• h^nK reason, *T' * n .. :tention, Mr, naunaers 
• *- ... t
 t • '...a. ne aoesn' t have to prove that Mi. 'hdrk 
arove the vph^^le unsafei\ •- , ni I hal and the other 
I-' he magic iitr.ie numner there, that the 
macmn-, w:ti; a •<---- •-.'
 : - n, mu I'tLified police 
off:"- • .. .i ncieiit, gnat's if 'Hay. That's 
wtai t..t government's ca:"^ is ar M r . 
I HI ^ . _ ,:,o> testimony by the deputy 
t-~t^:.*-, consistent, necessanlv F . ObviousJ; hn i<<fj'.;-]'i 
certified. You n * n~ •-. . _..at means, what it may or 
ma y mea^ /* - quioo 1 e a 1 i 111 e r; _ t with the polirv « - f t i ce r s 
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1 i as to you know, (inaudible) would you do this, would you do 
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I 
that and you know, to some extent that may be a little 
exaggerated. The real point is, you know, I may be very smart, 
but I can look into the (inaudible) hard client and defend 
somebody or get a date with somebody because I have to abide by 
the law. I have to take the test; I have to, you know, to be 
an attorney, I have to be interviewed. I have to do all those 
things and I'm asking you here, to uphold the part of the vow. 
You can't ignore one and chose the other and that's why we're 
here. 
I submit to you that if the government's case is 
about that little magic number, you know, that that's not so, 
they haven't got the common item at all, .093. Okay. We're 
human beings. We make mistakes. We have different 
recollections. My client has been through the system. He 
didn't drive for a mile. He noticed - you know, he was waiting 
for the light to change. He starts driving. As he picked up 
speed, he noticed the flat tire, pulls over. It's not as if he 
pulled over because the cop was behind him, nothing like that 
according to the testimony. He admitted to drinking a beer, 
maybe two, one and half, whatever we're quibbling about and I 
suppose that had everything gone well, according the book or 
according to how things should be, we probably wouldn't be 
trying this case. But we're here because that did not happen. 
We ask you to believe that the government has in fact 
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1 i f a ; „ : _ _ . - . . _ ^U^ .^ , . / O e y u i . ^ d - c a S u n d u x t Q . ; . 
I t ' s ~ n e i r burden, HCL u u r s . . i - . ~o ask y?L t o 
3 • - j c - s t i o r s and remember t h a t freedom i s j •=* 
4
 s ; v u : trie c r r e a t e s r va ! ' : e we have r v . 
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'A , ano TP* I: air: . v 
escaped El Salvador .in-i -^r^ra: An* 
beinc — -.....•: 
->- we: 
not E_ oalvaac: - H'"»t ^  
,i: :ne Civil War ar.c! this is 
- : - Th i s 
_^ O AAW U \ 
-JILei I C d . a r e a t e r va 
go here. "I a i' ot- Lter tc r somebody wr • : - —:: 
: r^^ than to cor"' • inn. rem. it Trie proof .5 not 
complete, if the proof is not satisfactory, "' \ \ ."i1
 }> , 
your duty -it is n ~ •" iwu" thai we're asking - you must 
aoqu .i. L M r. 3 t ar k Thari k y ou . 
THE COURT; Yrn uajy respond? 
Mb1. OAUNDERS: ThanK y:u four Honor. 
What evidence do we * e test and the 
c h " - .- -..^i . ^h^ oi.iv evidence that we have in from 
Deputy faibot. He indicates that ~ . : in- i^llowed 
that, correoi ° Tl.r defendant never oisputed that. "r.ere'o no 
evidence that that test was never foiloweo -^pute 
as to the : - v~ ^ - • . at ^ na^ 
Again, * .at tnat instruction savs specifically about 
the certification inf - • : aertification of Deputy 
*:,ilb'»t. ,i'i'.1 it's aifect :r .ac-i of affect upon the tes* r^11!4", 
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